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Abstract
For an economy competing at the global frontier, an innovation-based growth strategy requires a well-
developed technological infrastructure, a set of capabilities-focused technology policies, as well as an institutional
environment that stimulates innovation and entrepreneurship. This paper examines the role played by science and
technology policy in an economy’s transition to an innovation-based growth strategy. We discuss the challenges
governments face as they restructure economic institutions to deepen R&D capabilities and encourage technology
creation. We review Singapore’s experience in this regard and assess its ongoing efforts to remake itself to compete
at the global frontier.
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Knowledge is the only instrument of production not subject to diminishing returns.
J.M. Clark
1. Introduction
Technological progress and innovation play an important role in economic growth. Over the past
century, the wealthiest nations are those that had developed cutting edge technological capabilities that
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allow them to become global technological leaders (World Development Report [1]). Countries, such as
the United States, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, Finland, Denmark, and Israel, are commonly
regarded as leaders at the global technological frontier. Their growth experiences offer important lessons
for other countries attempting to emulate their economic successes. In East Asia, for instance, newly
industrialized economies, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, have transformed their
economies since the 1970s by improving the technological sophistication of their industries with well-
thought-out technology policies. With their deepened technological capabilities, they now compete
globally with advanced industrialized countries in a number of sectors.
Nations at different levels of development face different challenges, and the choice of an appropriate
growth strategy depends on the initial factor endowments and existing technological capabilities.
Economies that are well endowed with primary resources may initially pursue a factor-driven growth
strategy. As they progress to the frontier however, the ability to innovate and create new technologies
becomes an important source of competitive advantage. In general, there are three aspects of an
innovation-based growth strategy: (a) a well-developed technological infrastructure, (b) a set of
capabilities-focused science and technology policies, and (c) coordinated shift in government institutions
and policies.
A country’s technological infrastructure encompasses the education system, the network of research
organizations, and the legal framework that protects intellectual property rights and provides incentives
to create and exchange technologies. To develop the technological infrastructure, a well-structured
technology policy that stimulates innovation and encourages entrepreneurship becomes a critical
component of the growth strategy.
At its broadest level, a nation’s science and technology policy facilitates the development of
innovation and technology creation capabilities at the regional and national level and helps to initiate
learning networks that can lead to sustained technological progress and economic development. As
Conceicao et al. [2] noted, the ability of the United States to generate new scientific knowledge emerged
with any significance almost one century after the industrial revolution, which was born in Europe. The
impetus for the surge in the United States’ capabilities in innovation and technology creation came about
with the emergence in the 19th century of an indigenous American technological community, pursuing a
learning trajectory to adapt European technologies to the American setting.
As a country progresses towards the technological frontier, policies in science and technology need to
adapt and evolve as well. In the early stages of economic development, technological progress can come
about through an imitation strategy that emphasizes moving up the technology ladder and the
accumulation of physical and human capital. As the technological gap closes, science and technology
policies must focus more on developing innovation capabilities.
Governments can play an important role in driving technological progress and in fostering an
environment for innovation. In the case of Singapore, sound economic planning and concerted efforts by
the government to attract foreign investments were key factors behind its phenomenal growth pace,
averaging 8% per annum, since the country gained independence in 1965. Lately, however, there have
been concerns that the development strategy that Singapore had adopted for the past few decades may no
longer be sufficient—now that Singapore is competing closer to the technological frontier—and that a
new strategy emphasizing innovation and technology creation is needed to propel the economy forward.
The Singapore government has stepped up its efforts to remake the economy’s institutions and
technological infrastructure in order to foster an environment conducive to innovation and technology
creation.
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Since 1990, Singapore has made great strides in broadening and deepening its technology creation
capabilities. According to the 2003 World Competitiveness Report [3], published by the Institute for
Management Development (IMD), Singapore ranked number one in attracting top global talent among
29 economies with a population of fewer than 20 million. Singapore has consistently been ranked among
the top 5 to 10 countries in the world in terms of technology-using indicators in the Global Technology
Competitiveness Report, [4] published by the Word Economic Forum (WEF). These include the quality
of science and technology education, adoption of information and communications technology (ICT),
licensing of foreign technologies, as well as the use of advanced technologies in production and process
management capabilities.
However, competition is getting keener as other high-tech hotspots in Shanghai, Israel, and Ireland
compete with Singapore for global talent and capital. The role of science and technology policy takes on
added importance as Singapore transitions to an innovation-based growth strategy. In the 2002–2003
WEF Global Competitiveness Report [5], Singapore was ranked number one in terms of its innovation
policy, winning top scores for its effectiveness in protecting intellectual property, as well as for its
support of R&D through various tax incentives and grants. These efforts at building sustainable progress
in technology creation capabilities has boosted Singapore’s ranking in national innovative capacity from
10th to 13th, from the previous study in 2001–2002. The top 10 rankings in the 2002–2003 study are
United States, United Kingdom, Finland, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, Taiwan, Canada, and
Singapore.
Although the institutional spheres of science, government, and industry have become intertwined
through governmental policies in science and technology, the analysis of their relative roles in
innovation and technological progress has remained largely outside the framework of traditional
economic growth models (Freeman and Soete [6] ) Our objective in this paper is to examine the role that
governments play as a country transitions to an innovation-based growth strategy to compete at the
global frontier. We shall use Singapore as the context for our study.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present a framework, adapted from Porter [7]
for economic development and technological progress, and discuss the different aspects of an
innovation-based growth strategy. In Section 3, we examine the role that governments play in fostering
an environment that is conducive to innovation and that is supportive of basic research. In Section 4, we
assess Singapore’s technological progress in the context of its economic development since 1965. We
review the recent policies that were implemented to deepen and strengthen innovative and
entrepreneurial capabilities. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the challenges that
Singapore faces going forward.
2. Economic development and technological progress
Technology is essentially an integrated body of knowledge, ideas, and methods resulting from a
variety of activities conducted in the pursuit of knowledge. These activities include both learning-by-
doing improvements to existing methods of production, or large-scale purposeful R&D projects to find
better methods. The process of technological discovery and creation is often seen as a multiplicative
process (as argued by Romer [8]), where new ideas emerge from the improvements of existing
knowledge. The pace of new idea discovery depends on the body of accumulated knowledge, and
technological progress is frequently a sequence of small increments on a continuous path. Other authors
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such as Weitzman [9] have argued an even more powerful combinatoric growth process, where new
ideas do not simply emerge from single previous ideas, but rather from the combination of two or more
previous ideas: b. . .all innovations, being expression of the human imagination, are in a sense
combinatoric,Q (page 201, Weitzman [10]).
Many empirical studies of economic growth have shown that the huge differences in per capita output
across countries are, in large part, due to differences in technological capabilities, broadly defined (see
Temple [11] for a recent survey of the literature). The presence of diminishing returns in production
means that low-income economies cannot hope to catch up to high-income countries to attain the same
standard of living simply by means of accumulation of factor inputs or capital alone. In the long run,
only faster technological progress in the lower-income economies can bring about the convergence of
per capita output.
For an economy at the global frontier, science and technology policy is focused on the creation of new
knowledge through bfrontierQ research. For a less developed economy that faces resource constraints, the
benefits of scientific and technological progress can be realized quickly through the diffusion of
knowledge, the implementation of a technology policy that emphasizes moving up the technology
ladder. In this sense, countries further away from the technological frontier are at an advantage relative to
those closer to the frontier, because they can imitate and adapt existing technologies. Indeed, because it
is less costly and easier to adapt existing knowledge that it is to develop new technology from scratch,
then for any given level of production, investment, or R&D expenditures, economies further away from
the frontier should be able to grow faster. This seems to fit broadly the experience of the fast-growing
Asian economies and many Latin-American economies, but for most African nations, rapid growth
appeared to have eluded them.
The impact technological progress on economic growth and development is often examined in the
context of national innovation systems. At its broadest level, a national innovation system encompasses
all types of innovation activities, which include formal R&D, informal learning-by-doing improve-
ments, as well as technological transfer and imitation strategies. There is a large body of literature on
national innovation systems that analyzes the interaction among the four groups of actors in this process,
namely, the administrative organizations that formulate and coordinate policies, as well as control the
public financial organizations, the private research sector, the higher education institutions, and the
institutions that interface among the different actors. The literature on this subject includes Dosi [12],
Freeman [13], Lundvall [14], Nelson [15] and Freeman and Soete [6], Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff [16],
and Etzkowitz et al. [17].
2.1. Stages of economic development
What are the appropriate science and technology policies that countries located at different
distances from the technological frontier should adopt? A relevant framework in this discussion is a
framework adapted from Porter [7], as shown in Fig. 1. In this framework, economic development
Fig. 1. A Framework for economic growth strategies.
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is a process of successive upgrading, in which a nation’s business environment evolves to support
and encourage increasingly sophisticated and productive ways of competing by firms and
subsidiaries based there.
Economies at different stages of economic growth face different growth paths. Those that are
well endowed with primary resources may initially pursue a factor-driven growth strategy. In the
factor-driven stage, basic factor conditions, such as low-cost labor and availability of natural
resources, provide the main sources of competitive advantages. In this growth phase, domestic firms
produce commodities or relatively simple products designed in other, more advanced countries.
Technology is assimilated through foreign direct investment and the import of capital goods and
machinery. A factor-driven economy is sensitive to world economic cycles, commodity price trends,
and exchange rate fluctuations.
In the investment-driven stage, efficiency in manufacturing and service production provides the
dominant source of competitive advantage. An investment-based growth strategy emphasizes technology
acquisition by moving up the technology ladder, as well as the accumulation of physical and human
capital. New technology is often embodied in machines through the investment in new equipment. De
Long and Summers [18] have examined the data on a large number of economies and found a strong
statistical correlation between investment in productive equipment and growth rates. This stage of
economic development is characterized by intensive investment in an efficient business infrastructure,
proenterprise government administration, strong investment incentives, and easy access to financial
capital. The economies at this stage of development not only assimilate foreign technology but start to
develop the capacity to improve upon it.
Finally, in the innovation-driven stage, the ability to innovate, design, and produce new products and
services at the global technological frontier provides the dominant source of competitive advantage. An
innovation-based growth strategy emphasizes entrepreneurship, technology creation, and the develop-
ment of internal growth engines. Institutions and incentives are structured to support innovation and
entrepreneurship. In this growth phase, governments can play an important role to stimulate a high rate
of innovation, through both public investments in R&D, supporting higher education, improved access
to venture capital, and putting in place regulatory systems that facilitate the start-up of high-technology
enterprises (Global Competitiveness Report, WEF, [5]).
While Porter’s framework provides a broad framework for understanding the different phases of
technological development, there are nuances that might prove to be relevant for individual
economies. For instance, the transition from an investment-based growth strategy to an innovation-
based growth strategy is not likely to take place over a short time period. The leap from
manufacturing-focused applied research to basic research is a huge one, and while the transition is
desirable in the long-term, the importance of development the intermediate domain of applied
technology research—which forms an crucial middle ground between manufacturing and basic
research—cannot be underestimated. The types of applied technologies include those areas that are
critical to commercializing technology development.
In the case of Singapore, which attempts to transition to an innovation-based economy, greater
emphasis should perhaps be placed on its manufacturing expertise that it currently has, and by
leveraging on the accumulated expertise in these areas, it could develop a potentially high-value
adding transition pathway from its prior manufacturing orientation towards a basic research
orientation. Product design and development could be a potentially important niche for Singapore’s
innovation-based economy.
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2.2. Technological infrastructure and economic development
Economic development and the creation of a nation’s competitive advantages are clearly intertwined.
Moreover, the transition from one phase of economic growth to another necessitates changes in the
economy’s institutions and policies that embody the incentive structures for innovation. Such regime
changes will often require coordinated transformation of many interdependent institutions and policies.
For factor-driven economies, the upgrading of infrastructure (including electricity, communications,
and transport networks), establishment of a sound regulatory environment, and the lifting of barriers to
competition (e.g., trade restrictions and distortionary government subsidies) are critical components of
the growth strategy. This foundation of efficiency sets the stage for the transition to the investment-
driven phase of economic development. However, as the economy reaches the limit of investment-driven
growth, improvement in production efficiency is no longer enough, and the greatest potential for
economic growth lies in innovation and the production of cutting-edge technologies.
Developed economies that are located at the global frontier (such as United States, Germany, Japan,
and the Scandinavian countries) and engaged in innovation-driven growth strategies attribute a large part
of their economic successes to the high national capacities they possess for innovation and technology
creation. In turn, national innovative capacity depends critically on the quality of the technological
infrastructure (such as the supply of scientists and engineers and the number and quality of research
institutions), the degree of government support for basic research, the collaboration between research
institutions and universities, the availability of venture capital as well as the quality of the business
environment (as reflected in the regulatory framework).
A country’s technological infrastructure is a key determinant of a nation’s capabilities in innovation.
Broadly speaking, a country’s technological infrastructure encompasses the education system, the network
of private and public research organizations and scientific associations, the legal institutions such as
intellectual property rights and legislations which provide incentives to develop and exchange
technologies.
While providing an environment for technology creation is important for an innovation-based
growth strategy, reaping the benefits depends equally on an environment that includes a high level
of education of the workforce, high demand for new technological products by the private sector, a
high-quality information infrastructure that permits the flow and dissemination of knowledge and
information. The educational level and quality of workforce are clearly important aspects of a
country’s capacity for innovation. It is probably just as difficult for an economy located far from
the technological frontier to adapt and use existing technologies, with an uneducated workforce, as
it is for an economy at the technological frontier to create new technologies with a highly educated
workforce.
The presence of a well-developed infrastructure and strong innovation capabilities acts as a global
magnet for talented individuals. Countries such as Ireland and Singapore have successfully provided local
and foreign enterprises with a young and qualified labor force that possesses strong IT skills, making the
countries attractive destinations for foreign investments, and in turn, attracting other professional talent.
2.3. Distance from technological frontier
While it is common in the theoretical literature on economic growth to refer to the
technological gap as distance from the global technological frontier, in practice, the technological
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gap is multidimensional. A measurement of the technological gap necessitates a study of a broad
set of indicators and institutional features to determine the relative standings of different
economies.
Table 1 provides an overview of the key technological developments over the past
two and a half centuries, and the sectors that defined the technological frontier in each
phase.
The basic statistics that provides one with a picture of a country’s technological capabilities are
the expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP, the number of research scientists per 10,000
labor force, the number of scientific articles published, as well as the number of patents filed and
granted. These statistics can be computed from the World Bank’s 2002 World Development
Indicators database. We present the statistics in the Appendix in Tables A.1 and A.2. Table A.1
provides the latest information of where the countries stand right now, while Table A.2 provides the
average measures of the various indicators from 1980 to 2000. It is clear from a close study of
Tables A.1 and A.2 that countries situated at different distances from the technological frontier
differ markedly in their abilities and available resources to invest in R&D and produce new
technologies.
In Fig. 2, we plot GDP growth rates against the expenditure on R&D, as a percentage of
the GDP. We note that developed countries that are at the technological frontier, led by the
United States, are located mostly in the lower right-hand corner of Fig. 1. They invested
more in R&D, but their economic growth rates have average about 3%. By contrast, many of
the newly industrialized economies of East Asia (such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand)
had spent relatively little on R&D from 1980 to 2000. Nonetheless, these economies were
able to grow rapidly on the back of a rapid industrialization and export-oriented economic
program. South Korea appeared to be an outlier among the fast-growing industrializing
economies in the 1980s, as its expenditure on R&D, as a percentage of GDP, far outstripped
the other Asian economies. South Korea’s higher expenditure on R&D has paid off to
some extent as the country is now regarded as an attractive destination for venture capital
investment in wireless technology, given the country’s well-developed infrastructure and Internet
usage.
Comparing the statistics in Table A.1 and Table A.2, it is clear that the East Asian economies
have stepped up their investments in R&D in recent years. In particular, according to the latest
Table 1
The global technological frontier—1770s to 2003
Period Key technology developments Key sectors
1770s to 1840s Mechanization Textiles, canals, turnpike roads
1830s to 1890s Steam power and railway Steam engine, railway, world shipping
1880s and 1940s Electrical and heavy engineering Electrical engineering, chemical process industries,
steel ships, heavy armaments
1930s and 1980s Fordist mass production Automobiles, aircraft, consumer durables, synthetic materials
1970s to 1990s Information and communication Computers, software, telecommunications, digital technologies
1990s to 2003 Biotechnology Gene therapies, new pharmaceutical products
Source: adapted from Freeman and Soete [6], Table 3.5.
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OECD report (source: OECD, http//:www.oecd.org), China has jumped to third in the world in
terms of gross expenditure on R&D. China’s total R&D spending in 2001 reached nearly US$60
billion, just behind the United States and Japan, which had expenditures of US$282 billion and
US$104 billion, respectively. China came in ahead of Germany’s US$54 billion, while India
spent about US$19 billion, putting it among the top 10 countries worldwide. China’s expenditure
on R&D has grown rapidly, from 0.6% pf GDP to 1.1%. Most of the increase in R&D
expenditure is attributed to higher business investment, indicating that China has moved rapidly
towards developing its knowledge-based industries. Most of the R&D expenditure in China has
gone into applied technologies, such as the development of new cell phones or auto technology
that then uses conventional engineering techniques. China now has the second highest number of
researchers in the world, with 743,000 behind the 1.3 million in the United Stated, but ahead of
Japan and Russia with 648,000 and 505,000, respectively. Among OECD countries, Sweden has
the highest R&D spending, at 4.3% of GDP, followed by the United States at 2.8% and UK at
1.9%.
Fig. 2. GDP Growth versus R&D expenditure as percentage of GDP: 1980 to 2000.
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Fig. 3 plots the number of research scientists per 10,000 labor force versus the expenditure
on R&D as a percentage of GDP, using the latest available data (as presented in Table A.1 in
the Appendix). The general positive relationship between the two variables, as evident in Fig.
3, suggests that technologically advanced countries, which invest more in R&D, also possess
greater innovation capacities, as measured by the normalized number of research scientists and
engineers.
Another important indicator of the success of R&D investment is scientific output in the
form of publications in peer-reviewed scientific journals. This scientific output forms the basis
to disseminate and deepen innovation and is an important means to develop a country’s
innovation capabilities. Pavitt and Patel [19] have shown that among the OECD countries, both
scientific papers per capita and GNP per capita are significantly correlated with business-funded
R&D as a share of GNP, a measure that appears to be a key indicator of national
technological activities.
Fig. 3. Number of research scientists and engineers versus expenditure on R&D as percentage of GDP.
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In Fig. 4, we plot the number of scientific articles published in 1997 per 10,000 population versus
expenditure on R&D. Again, there is a positive relationship between the expenditure on R&D and
innovation capabilities.
3. The role of government in technological progress
While investment in R&D is an important factor in the development of innovation capabilities,
innovation performance also depends critically on conditions that foster technology entrepreneur-
ship, the availability of technical talent, and well-functioning product and capital markets.
Differences in the business environment for startups, such as their access to human capital and
venture capital, the degree to which they are subject to administrative regulations, and the
conditions for entrepreneurship, can have measurable impacts on innovation and economic
performance.
Fig. 4. Number of scientific articles published in 1997 per 10,000 population versus expenditure on R&D as percentage of GDP.
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The appropriate policies and infrastructure that stimulate technological creation and innovation are a
mixture of human capital, technical talent, institutions, incentives, hardware, policies, and investments.
Collectively, they shape a nation’s capacity to create and maintain its competitive advantages in
innovation and technology creation. In the 21st century, the ability to create, distribute, and exploit
knowledge has become a major source of competitive advantage, wealth creation, and improvements in
the quality of life.
In general, there are four main roles that governments can play in structuring the science and
technology policy and in fostering technology creation and adoption. First, the government can nurture
a broad and productive R&D culture, closely linked to higher education. Second, the government,
either directly or through its agencies, can also act as the principal investor in those areas of research in
which private enterprises cannot operate effectively. Third, governments can also lower the cost of risk
taking by encouraging strong university–industry interactions, providing incentives for cooperative
premarket basic research. Finally, they can play an important role to facilitate the commercialization of
publicly financed research and enabling business and consumers to adapt to new market demands and
opportunities.
Besides the government, many other national and local institutions play important roles in
technological progress and a nation’s economic development. Universities, schools, infrastructure
providers, standard-setting agencies, and a host of other organizations are critical components in the
environment for technology creation. In particular, strong linkages between universities, industry, and
government are crucial in fostering an innovation culture.
In the 1980s, spurred by concerns that its industrial competitiveness was being eroded by Japanese
industry, the United States government implemented a number of programs to strengthen research
collaboration between industry and universities and between industry and government-funded research
institutions. Among the initiatives undertaken, antitrust regulations were relaxed to stimulate
technological innovation and research collaboration among enterprises.
Other countries, such as Australia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Norway, have
also undertaken similar programs of structural reform to strengthen competition, push firms to improve
performance, and encourage innovation. The experience of many OECD countries has shown that a
market environment that removes the barriers to competition is crucial for innovation. Firms invest in
innovation and in efficiency-enhancing technology if they can expect sufficient returns and if
competition forces them to do so.
In Japan, the postwar economic policy has placed strong emphasis on the development of capabilities
to dcatch upT with the United States and other technologically advanced nations. Japan’s Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) had the responsibility to coordinate interindustry collaboration
to build the nation’s industrial capabilities (Freeman [20]). Beginning in the 1960s, MITI assembled and
funded groups of firms and research institutions to conduct cooperative research in key targeted
industries (computers, automobiles, consumer durable goods).
In the 1990s, Japan’s prolonged recession and the success of Silicon Valley prompted the Japanese
government to review its national innovation system and industrial models, which were characterized by
large corporations and rigid institutional structures. The Japanese government sought to develop a more
flexible, competitive, and open research environment. This culminated in the Science and Technology
Basic Plan of 1996, which emphasizes technology innovation and diffusion, as well as the development
of a more flexible employment system for researchers in government research institutes, in order to
encourage personnel mobility (Hee and Hirasawa [21]).
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Besides Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are two other Asian economies that have benefited from
strong government involvement in formulating policies for innovation and technology development
(see Kim [22]).
3.1. Economic institutions and technology policy
Apart from technological infrastructure and government policies, the set of economic institutions that
exist in an economy also influences the environment for technological progress and economic growth
(Conceicao et al. [23], Conceicao et al. [24]). At the macroeconomic level, the set of factors that fosters a
conducive environment for innovation and technology creation are steady economic growth, low
inflation, openness to trade and foreign direct investment, strong intellectual property protection regimes,
and a policy to ensure fair competition.
Over the past two decades, countries such as Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom have utilized different versions of the Foresight Program as part of the science and technology
policy to identify long-term trends in technological developments and to position their countries to take
advantage of the emerging trends (see Kameoka et al. [25], Kuwahara [26]). In Japan’s case, the Delphi
method has been used, while in the case of the United Kingdom, the focus was on sectoral panels (Webster
[27]). Nonetheless, the outputs of these various foresight programs were similar; there was a general
recognition of the importance of information technologies, communications, biological innovations, and
other core technologies. The similar findings are not surprising, as the convergence of the various
innovation frameworks reflect, to some extent, the internationalization of R&D in many areas (Webster
[27]), driven by global research networks as well as international regimes of governance that shape the
terms of which new technology is to be developed, deployed, or commercialized.
Since the 1990s, many countries have adopted the Silicon Valley model of technology creation by
emphasizing the role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Because innovative activities take place
within firms and research institutions, technological progress and economic growth ultimately depend on
how the private sector responds to technology policy. A number of European countries, such as France,
Germany, and the Netherlands, provide substantial incentives for SMEs to integrate their research and
boost their capacity to innovate in advanced technologies.
While intellectual property protection is necessary to set the appropriate incentives for innovation, it is
important that a balance be struck between providing incentives for innovation but allowing for the
diffusion of fundamental technologies. Governments must also establish a framework to benchmark
performance among publicly funded research institutions in the national innovation system (The World
Bank [28]), in order to ensure that efficient organizations are given more resources and inefficient
organizations are brought up to international standards. Additionally, barriers that impede the flow of
knowledge between basic research and industry should be removed. Finally, while cooperation between
firms is important for innovation by helping to share risks and facilitate knowledge diffusion, a strong
competition policy must be put in place to ensure that fair play and efficiency are not compromised.
3.2. Government investment in basic research
The objective of basic research is to discover new fundamental knowledge or understanding of the
subject without specific applications in mind, although it may be in fields of present or potential
commercial interest (Pavitt [29]). By contrast, applied research is aimed at gaining knowledge to
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determine the means by which a specific, recognized need may be met. Applied R&D is therefore
oriented to discovering new scientific knowledge that has specific commercial objectives with respect to
products, processes, or services.
A key consideration in the financing of basic research is appropriability. Nelson [30] and Arrow [31]
provided the earliest economic justification for government support of basic research, namely, the
existence of external economies which would not be fully explored or exploited, if the business firms
undertaking the basic research tried to capture all the benefits for themselves, either through secrecy or
property rights. Even if potential gains from R&D are appropriable, but the respective industry consists
only of small firms, government intervention may be required because no single firm has the means to
make a large capital-intensive investment with an uncertain outcome and a long gestation period.
In the last decade, private investment in basic research has increased with the development of a global
venture capital industry, particularly in the case of Silicon Valley. For instance, venture capital was
responsible for a significant amount of the investment in nanotechnology, ultrawideband wireless
technology. However, private sector funding will never completely replace government funding, which
remains important to provide the early seeds of innovation.
Kortum and Lerner [32] examined the impact of venture capital on patented inventions in the United
States across 20 industries over three decades. The authors found that increases in venture capital activity
in an industry are associated with significantly higher patenting rates. While the ratio of venture capital
to R&D averaged less than 3% from 1983 to 1992, they found that venture capital had accounted for
about 8% of the industrial innovations over the period.
Because basic research typically occurs on the technological frontier, its economic value is difficult to
forecast or even to gauge accurately in retrospect (Dasgupta and David [33]). Economic payoffs from the
application of new ideas or technologies may also take a long time to be realized. In cases where private
enterprises cannot capture all the private gains from R&D, social returns may exceed potential private
returns. Government support of basic research (through matching grants and subsidies) is justifiable in
these situations.
Governments are also under increasing public pressure to fund commercially relevant research given
the large scale of funding required (Pavitt [34]). Such pressure may cause government funding to be
skewed towards dsaferT later-stage research, leading towards relative neglect of early dventure capitalT
type support for cutting-edge research. As David et al. [35] argued, bthe outputs of basic research rarely
possess intrinsic economic value. Instead, they are critically important inputs to other investment
processes that yield further research findings, and sometimes yield innovations,. . .policies that focus
exclusively on the support of basic research with an eye to its economic payoffs will be ineffective
unless they are also concerned with these complementary factors.Q
Basic research has played key role in enabling technological advances, especially in medicine and
electronics. In the United States, the focus of the government-funded R&D has historically been on
defense-related and medical research. Strong government funding in these areas has helped the United
States to maintain its high-tech industrial leadership. Some of the high-profile federal investments in
technological infrastructure include projects such as high-speed Internet and the Human Genome
Project, and even with investments in some more speculative ideas, such as hydrogen fuel to replace
fossil fuel for powering cars and trucks. U.S. universities conduct a major portion of publicly funded
basic research, and there is a long history of close collaboration between universities and industry. Narin
et al. [36] found that 73% of the papers cited by U.S. industry patents are the output of public science,
authored at academic, governmental, and other public institutions funded by the Federal government. In
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1990, U.S. universities were responsible for 18% of all U.S. patents dealing with genetic engineering and
recombinant DNA, 16% of patents dealing with natural resins/peptides or proteins, and 12% of patents
dealing with chemicals involving microbiology and molecular biology (see Kumar [37]).
In terms of the share of published articles by field of research, the United States continues to lead in
space sciences, clinical medicine, biomedical research, and biology. The extension of patent protection to
publicly funded research (the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980) has had a significant impact on the rate of
technology transfer from science.
3.3. Research linkages with industry
While investment in basic and applied research is a prerequisite for technological change and
economic efficiency, the emphasis on research is not a presumption that scientific discovery and
invention will inevitably result in technological innovation, and in turn create economic
competitiveness. At the firm level, the development of new technology does not in itself guarantee
commercial success for firms operating in domestic and international markets (Berry [38]). Close
linkages with industry must be developed if the new technologies are to translate into marketable
products that can find a global market.
Policy developments in the United States over the past two decades have strengthened the incentives
for academic researchers to engage in industrially relevant research (Hane [39], Spencer [40]). In
particular, there are close linkages between basic research and graduate education (Miyata [41]).
Historically, U.S. corporations recruit a large number of PhD scientists to work in laboratories and in-
house research organizations. This process helps to strengthen the linkages between the educational and
industrial sectors and facilitates reciprocal knowledge flow (Westney [42]). As a result, U.S. corporations
have been able to draw upon a strong academic science base at home to support their radical and
entrepreneurial innovation strategies.
The situation in Japan was quite different. Until the mid-1980s, formal linkages between university
and the industrial sector in R&D collaboration had been limited. The main role of universities in Japan
was that of knowledge ddisseminatorsT to train and produce a steady stream of trained graduates for
industry, rather than as knowledge dgeneratorsT (Oka [43], Hee and Hirasawa [21]). Historically, few
Japanese corporations have strong linkages with Japanese universities in terms of collaboration in basic
research. The innovation strategies of Japanese firms had also tended to focus on applied R&D to
promote incremental product innovations. Public funding for basic research in Japan was also relatively
low compared with other advanced industrial economies. The sectors that had received the most funding
were in energy, engineering, electronics, and advanced materials. Funding for the university sector had
been particularly limited (Nakayama and Low [44], Clark [45]).
In the 1980s, Japan’s R&D policies were oriented more towards basic research, particularly to support
innovation in robotics and communications technology. While the linkages between academic research
and industry have increased, they are still significantly weaker compared with the situation in the United
States. Even as many Japanese firms sought to develop capabilities in basic research, a large number of
them went overseas to the United States and Europe to search for university tie-ups and to set up basic
research facilities, instead of collaborating with Japan-based institutions. These overseas facilities served
two purposes: first, to enable Japanese firms to learn the organizational routines of basic research; and
second, to help them to acquire basic research findings in certain specialized areas not available in Japan
(Hee and Hirasawa [21]).
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4. Singapore’s transition to an innovation-based economy
Having reviewed the literature on the role that governments play in facilitating technological progress
and economic growth, we turn our attention now to discuss the experience of Singapore as the
government restructures economic institutions and maps out new technology policies to position
Singapore as an innovation-based economy.
By all accounts, Singapore has one of the most impressive economic growth records among
newly industrialized economies. Since gaining independence in 1965, the Singapore economy has
grown at an average annual rate of about 8% over the past four decades. Despite significant
economic slowdown in the late 1990s, Singapore’s per capita GNP of US$23,000 in 2002, on
purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, still stands as the third highest in Asia and approached 70%
of the level of the United States (The 2003 World Bank Development Report [46]). In 1965,
Singapore’s PPP-adjusted per capita income was less than 16% of that of the United States; as
recently as 1980, it was still less than 50%.
Together with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea, Singapore is one of the four successful Tiger
economies. Singapore’s economic development model had combined an open-economy framework with
strong state involvement in labor, land, and industrial development policies. While this approach has
enabled the country to move from Third World to First World status, there has been growing concerns
lately that this development model needs to be fine-tuned now that the economy has to compete bclose to
the technological frontierQ of the global knowledge economy, as opposed to the earlier, easier task of
technological catch up.
As Singapore enters a new phase of development, its future economic growth will depend
increasingly on its ability to create domestic engines of growth and on its ability to engage in technology
creation. Singapore’s traditional policy incentives to attract and support large global MNCs not only may
not work in attracting young, entrepreneurial firms to the country, but this very strategy of relying on
large established MNCs for job creation and technology transfer may stifle the development of
indigenous entrepreneurship and innovation.
Going forward, it will become increasingly more difficult for Singapore to compete for global
investments. Although the government has taken steps to trim labor costs and other costs of doing
business in Singapore, Singapore remains an expensive business location in Asia. At the same time,
it is facing increasing competition from high-tech regions—such as Israel, Ireland, Shanghai, and
Beijing in China, Seoul in Korea, and Bangalore in India—for both professional talent and foreign
investments.
The Singapore government has taken steps to stimulate entrepreneurship, particularly in the
high-tech sector. Besides implementing regulatory and fiscal changes to make it easier to start
up businesses, the government had also set aside more than US$1 billion fund to invest in
venture capital funds and to attract top-tier venture capital funds to set up a regional base in
Singapore. At the same time, the government has also increased the research funding for
universities and aggressively courted professional talent to work in Singapore (Neidorf [47]). At
the National University of Singapore, research funding has increased from S$54 million in 1996
to S$156.6 million in 2001. Despite the decline in the global technology markets since April
2000 and the worldwide decline in venture capital funding for high-tech start-ups thereafter, the
Singapore government has remained committed to its strategy of encouraging technology
entrepreneurship.
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4.1. Singapore’s technological capabilities
Over the last four decades, Singapore’ development strategy has shifted from emphasizing using
technology to creating it. Broadly speaking, there are four main phases of Singapore’s technological
transition with respect to the global technological frontier (Wong [48]): (a) an industrial take-off phase
from 1960s to the mid-1970s, when there was high dependence on technology transfer from foreign
MNCs; (b) from mid-1970s to the late-1980s, there was rapid growth of local process technological
development within MNCs and the development of local supporting industries; (c) from late-1980s to the
late-1990s, there was rapid expansion of applied R&D byMNCs and by publicly funded R&D institutions;
(d) from late-1990s onwards, there was emerging emphasis on high-tech start-ups and the shift towards
technology creation capabilities.
Each successive phase of technological transition was built upon the resources and technological
capabilities accumulated in the earlier phases. In particular, there was a phased building up of MNCs, local
manufacturing enterprises (particularly in the electronics supporting industries), Public Research Institutes
and Centres (PRICs) and university R&D, and, finally, local high-tech start-ups pioneering new products.
In terms of the development of technology capability, there was a sustained shift from learning to use (with
high reliance on internal transfer by MNCs) to learning to adapt and improve (via blearning by doingQ
within MNCs as well as blearning by transactingQ in local firms acquiring external technology), learning to
innovate (mainly applied R&D in product or process), and finally, learning to pioneer (creating indigenous
technology and commercializing it in the marketplace through new ventures).
Table 2 shows that Singapore’s expenditure in R&D, in absolute amounts and as a percentage of GDP,
has increased steadily since 1978. Between 1987 and 2001, Singapore’s gross expenditure on R&D
Table 2
Singapore technological capabilities
Year Private
sector (S$m)
Higher
education
sector (S$m)
Government
sector (S$m)
Public research
institutes (S$m)
GERD
(S$m)
GERD/
GDP (%)
Public R&D
expenditure/
GDP (%)
RSEs RSE/10,000
labor force
1978 26 8 4 – 38 0.21 – 818 8.4
1981 44 24 13 – 81 0.26 – 1193 10.6
1984 107 70 38 – 214 0.54 – 2401 18.4
1987 226 95 54 – 375 0.86 – 3361 25.3
1990 310 120 99 43 572 0.84 – 4329 27.7
1991 442 147 97 71 757 1.00 – 5218 33.6
1992 578 156 105 111 950 1.19 0.47 6454 39.8
1993 619 157 107 116 998 1.07 0.41 6629 40.5
1994 736 180 142 117 1175 1.10 0.41 7086 41.9
1995 881 193 110 181 1367 1.16 0.41 8340 47.7
1996 1133 239 167 253 1792 1.40 0.51 10,153 56.3
1997 1315 278 216 296 2105 1.50 0.56 11,302 60.2
1998 1536 306 300 351 2492 1.81 0.69 12,655 65.5
1999 1671 310 305 371 2656 1.90 0.70 13,817 69.9
2000 1866 338 424 381 3010 1.88 0.72 18,302 83.5
2001 2045 367 425 396 3233 2.11 0.77 18,577 87.6
GERD—gross expenditure on R&D; RSE—research scientists and engineers.
Source: National Survey of R&D in Singapore, National Science and Technological Board and Agency for Science and
Technology Research.
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(GERD) had increased by more than seven times, reaching S$3.23 billion in 2001, or 2.11% of GDP.
Singapore’s R&D intensity was only around 0.2% in 1978 and was still less than 1% in 1990, but by
2001, it had risen to over 2%, exceeding the level of UK and the Netherlands, although still behind the
more advanced Scandinavian countries.
Another indicator of R&D investment intensity, as measured by the number of Research Scientists
and Engineers (RSEs) in total, and per 10,000 labor force, also shows that Singapore has made
significant progress, rising from less than 30 in 1990 to over 87 by 2001, with the latter figure being
above the OECD mean as well. Singapore has overtaken many OECD countries in terms of the
proportion of GDP devoted to R&D investment—although it still lags behind South Korea in this regard.
Within the public sector, the share of higher education in total R&D expenditure has declined, while
that of public research institutes has increased. As a further indicator of the deepening of Singapore’s
R&D system, the proportion of total R&D expenditures classified as bBasic ResearchQ had increased
from less than 12% in 1996 to over 15% by 2001 (source: Agency for Science and Technology
Research, Singapore [49]).
Despite the steady growth in R&D in recent years, Singapore’s R&D intensity remains lower
than in most advanced industrial countries. Given Singapore’s small size and the need to achieve
minimum critical mass in most areas of scientific endeavor, an immediate task is to increase
Singapore’s R&D intensity to the levels of advanced industrial countries. In this regard, it is
instructive to look at the rapid growth in R&D intensity in small countries such as Finland and
Israel (see Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix). The higher expenditures on R&D (as a percentage
of GDP) have led to impressive improvements in their global competitiveness in high-tech
industries.
Table 3 shows the growth rate of international scientific publications by Singapore-based institutions
between 1990 and 1999 versus major countries. With the exception of South Korea, Singapore has
achieved the highest annual growth rate of about 13% compared to an average of less than 3% for all
advanced countries. Measured in terms of publications per capita of population, Singapore had achieved
a level in 1998 that is similar to that in France and Germany and exceeded Japan.
While it is true that the impact of Singapore’s scientific publications (as measured by citations per
paper) still remains low when compared to the more advanced countries, this is largely due to the
recentness of Singapore’s publications. Nonetheless, the recent rise in the rate of scientific publications
suggests that the increase in R&D expenditure over the past decade is beginning to pay off in the form of
stronger innovation capabilities.
Besides the increase in the rate of scientific publications, the rate of patenting by Singapore-based
organizations has increased as well. Table 4 shows that the total number of patents filed by Singapore-
based organizations (including foreign affiliates) has increased from 142 in 1993 to 1456 in 2001, while
the numbers granted increased from 52 to 461. In 2001, the revenue derived from commercialized
products and processes attributed to R&D performed in Singapore amounted S$47 million, up sharply
from S$13 million in 2000. Revenues generated from licensing intellectual property to outside parties
have also increased steadily over the period 1993–1999.
Before the mid-1990s, the rate of patenting in Singapore had grown slowly, but the situation changed
markedly since the mid-1990s. For the period 1996–2001, the growth rate of Singapore’s utility patents
in the United States, as measured by the number of patents granted by the United States Patents and
Trademarks Office (USPTO) to Singapore-based inventors, was the highest among all OECD countries
as well as newly industrialized economies in Asia.
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In fact, in terms of patenting per capita, Singapore has achieved, by 2001, a level that exceeded some
OECD countries like France, UK, and Norway, although still significantly behind Taiwan, Germany,
Japan, and the United States (source: Database of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office [50]). Ho et al.
[51] provided empirical evidence to show that R&D investment in Singapore has had a significant
impact on its total factor productivity performance over the past two decades.
While there had been substantial improvement in Singapore’s innovative capacity, judging by the
sharp improvements in scientific output and patenting rates, Singapore is currently still ranked lower in
terms of technology-creation indicators like R&D expenditure and R&D personnel, availability of
venture capital, and intellectual property protection (ranking between 10th and 17th in the world)
according to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor.
According to the 2001 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) Report, there is a close association
between entrepreneurial activity and economic growth. The GEM report found that if a country has
substantial imports and exports, economic growth will reflect more of competitiveness in international
markets and will be less dependent on domestic developments. Countries with total value of
international trade exceeding GDP, including the Netherlands (total international trade was 100% of
GDP), Hungary (121%), Ireland (135%), Belgium (156%), and Singapore (295%), appeared to be less
dependent on domestic entrepreneurial activity to generate growth.
Table 3
Output of scientific articles
Rank Country Number of articles 1998
(per million inhabitants)
Growth rate of number of
publications 1990–1999 (%)
1 Switzerland 973.4 2.6
2 Sweden 945.44 0.72
3 Israel 873.87 0.63
4 Denmark 770.27 1.61
5 Finland 737.43 3.63
6 The Netherlands 684.75 0.95
7 United Kingdom 665.77 0.89
8 Canada 640.87 1.03
9 United States 612.04 1.06
10 Norway 588.2 1.25
11 Belgium 475.49 2.6
12 France 465.97 2.68
13 Germany 463.69 2.14
14 Austria 449.36 3.84
15 Singapore 433.44 12.96
16 Japan 371.42 3.15
17 Ireland 343.59 4.18
18 Italy 296.6 3.77
19 Taiwan 244.71 12.29
20 South Korea 119.58 21.96
21 Hong Kong 89.73 9.14
Article counts (on a per capita basis) are based on fractional assignments; for example, an article with two authors from different
countries is counted as one-half of an article for each country.
Source: Science and Engineering Indicators 2002, National Science Board.
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According to the GEM Report, Singapore is ranked lowest in specific measures of innovation like
intellectual property generation, quality of basic research institutions, product design, entrepreneurship,
and creation of firms (mostly lower than the top 20). In terms of entrepreneurial propensity, Singapore was
ranked 19th out of 21 countries covered in the Global EntrepreneurshipMonitor (GEM) studies from 2000
to 2002 (Reynolds et al. [52]. Similarly, although improving rapidly over time, Singapore was ranked
outside the top 20 in the world in terms of scientific publications in the Science Citation Index (Wong [48]).
In the GEM survey, 15 dimensions of Singapore’s environment for entrepreneurship was rated by a
panel of around 36–40 informants for the 3 years, from 2000 to 2002. Singapore was highly rated in
areas like physical and business infrastructure, financial capital availability, and government regulatory
and tax burden. However, the rating was below the mean score of 3 for the following seven
dimensions: education, technology transfer to new enterprises, culture and social norms, barriers to
market entry, market dynamism, perception of business opportunities, and capacity to act on business
opportunities. In particular, the low score of 2.6 for blow barriers to entryQ deserves attention, as it
highlights not only the constraints of Singapore’s small domestic market size but also concerns with
nonlevel playing field due to the absence of anticompetition laws and the considerable presence of
Table 4
R&D output indicators for Singapore, 1993–2001
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Number of patents applied
for in the year
142 263 242 316 490 579 673 1268 1096
Number of patents awarded
for the yeara
52 58 51 91 132 136 161 285 461
Total number of patents
owned as of the 31st
of Decemberb
200 204 256 614 831 847 1077 902 1456
Revenue from royalties
and licensing of
patents/new technologies
developed in
Singapore (S$ million)c
24.34 23.95 27.23 27.34 26.61 50.97 671.89 75 55.17
Sales revenue derived from
commercialized products or
processes attributable to
R&D performed in
Singapore (S$ million)
6.38
(7.2)d
9.65
(9.6)
13.37
(7.6)
10.66
(10.2)
13.00 46.51
Sales revenue derived
from commercialized
products/processes
attributable to R&D performed in
Singapore and launched
within the last 2 years (S$ billion)
5.04 6.10 8.03 8.06 8.33 7.00
Source: National Survey of R&D in Singapore (various years), National Science and Technology Board (NSTB), Agency for
Science and Technology Research (A-STAR).
a 1993–1995 is awarded to Singapore organizations only.
b 1993–1995 is for Singapore organizations only.
c 1993–1995 revenue from royalties and licensing of new technology/products developed in-house ($m).
d The numbers in parenthesis represents the percentage of total sales revenue.
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large, government-linked enterprises in the domestic economy. The similarly low score for market
dynamism may reflect a concern with the conservatism of large enterprises in Singapore, which has
been voiced by many start-up entrepreneurs as another negative aspect of Singapore’s domestic
business environment for entrepreneurship.
Although the rate of patenting in Singapore has improved sharply, a large proportion of Singapore’s
patenting activity was the result of the R&D efforts of MNCs rather than domestic entities. This was a
finding in Mahmood and Singh [53], which examined the innovation experience of a group of emerging
and newly industrialized economies over the past 30 years. Specifically, the authors utilized the U.S.
patent data to examine the expansion of the innovative capabilities of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong,
and Singapore in relation to other emerging economies in Asia and Latin America. The authors found
that the patenting activity in Singapore (as well as in Hong Kong) has consistently been much lower than
in South Korea and Taiwan. The lower levels of innovative activities in Singapore and Hong Kong led to
weaker technological capabilities as a result.
Although Singapore’s government-funded research institutions and local universities managed to spin
off a number of companies in the late 1990s, the commercial impact of these efforts had been relatively
modest. Fragmented regional markets, the lack of venture capital financing, as well as the shortage of
good managerial expertise hampered the expansion of many of these spin-offs. Most of them had to rely
on continued government support, through procurement contracting or outsourcing work, in order to
survive; eventually, many of these startups were economically unviable.
From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, public sector R&D, conducted by universities and public
research institutes (PRICs), accounted for some 40–50% of total R&D expenditure in Singapore.
However, since the early 1990s, the share of public sector R&D expenditure had declined to around 37%
and has remained relatively stable since 1993. In terms of U.S. patent output, local PRICs and
universities accounted for a proportionately lower share of the total U.S. patent granted to Singapore-
based inventors—4.5% over 1991–1995, 6.6% over 1996–2000, and 7.5% over 2001–2002—albeit with
an increasing trend.
More worrying is the fact that the extent of university–industry collaboration in R&D appeared to
remain relatively weak. In 2001, private sector funding accounted for only 2.6% of total university R&D
expenditure. In a survey of manufacturing firms at the end of 1999, the importance of collaboration with
local universities and public research institutes was ranked behind collaboration with customers and
suppliers (Wong and He [54]), although some improvements appeared to have occurred compared to
another survey 2 years earlier. The situation appears to be brighter in terms of the extent of university
technology commercialization through licensing. Based on data for the National University of Singapore
(NUS), the cumulative number of external technology licenses issued had increased to 107 as of mid-
2003, with about one-quarter issued since 2002.
A major constraint faced by Singapore is its size. In terms of per capita indicators, Singapore’s
R&D expenditure to GDP ratio, at 1.81% in 1998 is not far behind Britain’s 1.80%. In addition, in
terms of the number of researchers per 10,000 workers, Singapore’s figure is 69 in 1999, well
above South Korea (48 in 1998), even France and Germany (60 in 1998; source: World Bank
Development Indicators [55]). However, in population terms, Singapore is about half the size of
Hong Kong, one-seventh that of Taiwan, one-twentieth of Germany, and one-eightieth of the United
States. Thus, the number of scientists and researcher in Singapore is significantly smaller than in
the other countries. As noted by Hang [56], the target of 65 researchers per 10,000 workers, as set
out in the National Science and Technology Plan for 1996–2000 (to be discussed in Section 4.2)
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may be insufficient for Singapore. He argued that this was the main reason that small countries, such as
Israel, have set and achieved targets as high as 130.
The size constraint also implies that Singapore cannot afford an all-inclusive R&D policy.
Resources devoted to R&D have to be targeted judiciously in areas that can lead to competitive
advantages for Singapore. To augment the pool of local technical talent, the government has adopted
a liberal immigration policy to attract foreign scientists and engineers to staff the research
institutions. By 1999, 17.3% of the scientists and engineers engaged in R&D in Singapore were
foreign. It has also introduced other policies aimed at strengthening its technological capabilities and
expanding the pool of expertise. For instance, more postgraduate scholarships are being awarded for
PhD studies in the sciences, and there is a renewed emphasis on basic research (as opposed to the
former emphasis on applied research) in the government-funded research institutes and in the local
universities.
4.2. Singapore’s science and technology policies
While technological progress underpinned Singapore’s economic growth strategy, the first formal
science and technology plan was only implemented in 1991. In the early years of independence,
Singapore’s strategy was to attract multinational companies to the island state to produce for global
export markets. The high reliance on investment by global MNCs was part of a larger economic
development strategy that seeks to position Singapore as a major business node in the global system of
trade and capital flows (Wong [48]).
Nevertheless, strong efforts were consistently made in the early postindependence years to attract
multinational companies (MNCs), invest in education and skill training, and encourage technology
diffusion from MNCs to the local economy. Tax incentives were given for manufacturing companies that
undertook R&D in Singapore. The level of public commitment to R&D was confined largely to
scientific research in public universities and defence R&D, both of which had little commercial linkage
to industry.
The policy initiatives in the first 5-year National Technology plan, budgeted at S$2 billion, included
the acceleration in the development of technology infrastructure, encouragement of private-sector R&D,
and the development of technical manpower to support R&D (all figures for Singapore will be given in
Singapore dollars, unless otherwise noted). As of November 2003, the exchange rate is about S$1.75 to
US$1 dollar. Nine key areas were identified for development; these were information technology and
telecommunications; microelectronics and semiconductors; electronic systems; manufacturing technol-
ogy; materials and chemicals technology; environmental technology; energy, water and resources;
biotechnology; food and agrotechnology; and medical sciences.
The identification of these sectors for targeted development resulted from a variation of the Foresight
program that is used in United Kingdom and other European countries (Webster [27]). For each National
Technology Plan, a large number of individuals were approach to provide their views, and committees
were formed to brainstorm and assess the potential of each sector in terms of Singapore’s chances of
success to emerge as a regional leader in these targeted areas.
To accelerate the development and strengthening of capabilities in basic research, the National
Science and Technology Board (NSTB) funded the establishment of 13 research institutes in industry-
specific areas. In the Second National Science and Technology Plan (1996–2000), Singapore’s
technology strategy was bto build a world-class science and technology base in fields that match
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Singapore’s competitive strengths and that will spur the growth of new high value-added industries.Q
New milestones were set under the second Technology Plan, including (1) the ratio of R&D expenditure
to GDP was to reach 2.6% in 2000, against 1.1% in 1994; (2) the number of scientists and engineers was
to reach 65 per 10,000 workers. In 1998, the R&D expenditure to GDP ratio had reached 1.8% and there
were 66 scientists and engineers for every 10,000 workers. Other targets were met as well.
Several new policy initiatives were announced in 1998, including a master plan to promote skills
upgrading and accelerate the attraction of foreign talents, and a Technopreneurship 21 (or T21 for short)
initiative to foster high-tech start-ups. The T21 program represented the most visible policy shift by the
government from its focus to promote technology adoption to one that supports both technology
diffusion and technological innovation. The T21 initiative led to liberalization in business regulations
that were thought to stifle start-ups. Besides the amendment of bankruptcy laws, regulations and taxation
governing company stock options were revised and new tax-offset provision for losses incurred by
investors in high-tech start-ups were introduced.
Under the current third Technology Plan for 2001–2005, the government had set aside S$7 billion to
develop additional infrastructures and to attract international talent to Singapore. Listing rules on the
Singapore stock exchange were amended to allow technology to raise funds more easily. Entrepreneurs
were also allowed to start-up their ventures in the residences. As mentioned earlier, US$1 billion venture
capital fund was set up to invest in top-tier international venture capital firms, so that they will set up
regional headquarters in Singapore.
Reflecting the shift in focus to basic research under the Third National Science and Technology Plan,
the NSTB was reorganized in 2000 to focus on promoting research and developing R&D manpower,
taking on a role similar to that of the National Science Foundation (NSF) in the United States. Two
research councils were set up; namely, the Bio-Medical Research Council (BMRC) to award research
grants and develop R&D manpower in the life sciences, while the Science and Engineering Research
Council (SERC) was set up to oversee research in selected scientific and technological fields. In 2000,
the Singapore government announced a strategic push to promote life sciences research and industry
development, following the completion of the Global Genome Mapping project.
Therefore, by the late 1990s, Singapore was redoubling its efforts to broaden and deepen innovative
capabilities and to promote sustainable efforts in technology creation. With the establishment of the
public research institutes and a renewed push to invest in basic research, Singapore has laid the
technology foundations that complemented but were independent of the activities of the industrial
clusters that supported the MNCs in the manufacturing sector.
In 2001–2002, the Singapore government conducted a review of the Singapore economy. The
objective was to identify areas for restructuring. The final reports by the Economic Review Committee
(ERC) were submitted in late 2002. In the report of the Subcommittee on Entrepreneurship and
Internationalization, released in September 2002, there were a number of recommendations on policy
changes to remake Singapore into a competitive knowledge-based, entrepreneurially driven economy
(these reports of the Economic Review Committee can be assessed at http://www.erc.gov.sg). Although
some of the recommended policy shifts have in fact been initiated prior to the report, they have been
given greater impetus after the release of the ERC Report.
Specifically, the ERC Report identified six broad areas of policy emphasis to make the Singapore
economy more conducive for entrepreneurial development: (a) Culture: to influence the cultural values
of Singaporean towards entrepreneurship by providing students and working professionals more
opportunities to learn about entrepreneurship; (b) Capability building: to attract more entrepreneurial
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talents from overseas and encouraging greater mobility of talents between public and private sector; (c)
Conditions: to reduce government regulatory red-tapes and reviewing the role of government-linked
companies in the domestic economy; (d) Connectivity: to enhance the global connectivity of
Singaporean to the world; (e) Capital: to improve start-up and SME access to capital; and finally, (f)
Catalyst role of government: to extend investment and tax incentives currently available for large MNCs
to smaller enterprises as well.
4.3. Increased focus on basic research in Singapore
The focus of Singapore’s science and technology policy is now on longer-term basic research, as
opposed to the earlier emphasis on short-term applied R&D. In the 1970s and 1980s, publicly funded
R&D programs were focused on the development of applied technologies to meet industrial demand. As
Singapore was still progressing largely on an investment-driven growth strategy, this deficiency in
innovation and technology creation capabilities was not a major problem then. Recognizing the need to
expand innovation capacity, the first National Technology Plan for 1991–1995 focused on developing
capabilities in basic research, with the establishment of the 13 research institutes.
Before the 1990s, publicly funded R&D in Singapore was largely concentrated at the National
University of Singapore (NUS), the only university in the country then, and the Singapore Institute for
Standards and Industrial Research (SISIR) formed in the 1970s to set industry benchmarks and standards
for a variety of industrial products and processes. Other public research institutes were set up after the
implementation of the first National Technology Plan in 1991.
Table 5 shows the growth of the public research institutes (PRICs) since 1978 in terms of the
amount of R&D expenditure. Over the 1990–1999 period, R&D expenditure by PRICs had
expanded nearly ninefold, which is significantly faster than the growth of private R&D. By 1999,
Table 5
Number of organizations performing R&D, 1978–1999
Year Private sector Higher education sector Government sector Public research institutes Total
1978 63 4 23a – 90
1981 135 4 38a – 177
1984 143 4 20a – 167
1987 191 4 20a – 215
1990 266 5 4 7 292
1991 311 5 9 6 331
1992 331 5 13 5 354
1993 410 6 15 5 436
1994 427 6 16 5 454
1995 440 6 14 10 470
1996 496 6 11 13 526
1997 508 6 14 15 543
1998 571 6 13 14 604
1999 593 6 12 13 624
Source: National Survey of R&D in Singapore (various years), National Science and Technology Board.
a Figures include public research institutes. Definition of government R&D organizations was changed from 1990 onwards,
resulting in a smaller number of organizations being counted.
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the 13 public research institutes had accounted for over S$370 million (or 14%) of the aggregate
R&D expenditure (Wong [48]).
The initial mission of the public research institutes was to develop the applied technologies deemed
critical for the industrial clusters in existence in Singapore. In addition, some institutes had to develop
core competencies in new generic technologies (e.g., in molecular and cell biology and in wireless
communications) needed to attract new high-tech industries. Only 13.6% of R&D expenditure in 1999
was in basic research, compared to 36.3% for applied R&D and 50% for experimental development
(NSTB).
In the higher education sector, the tertiary institutions (two universities and four polytechnics) raised
their R&D expenditure by nearly three times over 1990–1999 to reach S$310 million by the end of the
period (Wong [48]). While the R&D portfolio of the local universities was supposed to be focused on
basic scientific research, they were also under tremendous pressure to conduct more applied R&D and to
foster industry linkages. Moreover, the key performance criteria for university academic staff continued
to be consistent publications in international journals, but the extent of technology licensing to the
private sector and the number of R&D collaborations with industry were also used to evaluate R&D by
tertiary institutions.
Table 6 provides the breakdown of the R&D expenditure undertaken in different types of research
programs. Basic research accounted for only 6% of the total R&D expenditure in 2001. In contrast,
applied research accounted for 31% of the total expenditure.
While the PRICs had met the quantitative targets of R&D expenditures and the training of technical
manpower, their effectiveness in developing the national innovative capacity is unclear. Moreover, their
changing roles over time have led to a number of problems. First, the PRICs were initially required by
the NSTB to spin off high-tech start-ups as part of the push to develop technology entrepreneurship in
Singapore. This policy initiative appeared to have been hastily implemented without addressing the
conflict with the objective of licensing existing companies—a key role that the PRICs were supposed to
play. As it turned out, the PRICs began to keep technologies they had developed from being licensed and
started to encourage their staff to start up companies to commercialize the technologies, in order that the
personnel involved could receive sizeable equity ownership in these start-ups. Secondly, the PRICs did
not have incentives to cooperate with each other in research or in technology or market intelligence
gathering and intellectual property management.
Linkages between research institutions and universities with the private sector were also less
developed, at least until the late-1990s. There were also few reported cases of joint R&D projects among
Table 6
R&D expenditure by sector and strategic focus (2001)
Year Private
sector (S$m)
Higher education
sector (S$m)
Government
sector (S$m)
Public research
institutes (S$m)
Total (S$m)
Pure basic research 25.26 87.87 5.76 69.81 188.70
Strategic basic research 90.02 105.34 32.79 79.59 307.75
Applied research 644.50 110.37 75.43 182.96 1013.26
Experimental research 1285.23 63.40 311.12 63.22 1722.98
Total R&D expenditure 2045.02 366.98 425.10 395.58 3232.68
Source: National Survey of R&D in Singapore, National Science and Technological Board, and Agency for Science and
Technology Research.
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local firms, and the kind of large R&D consortia found in Taiwan and Japan have been largely absent in
Singapore. Although there were some attempts at promoting R&D consortia, the extent of interfirm
collaboration paled in comparison to countries like Taiwan and Finland (Wong [48]). There were also
few collaborative partnerships between the research institutions and leading overseas R&D institutions.
In response to these problems, the government introduced an institutional restructuring in early 2001.
The responsibility for implementing T21 was taken out of the hands of NSTB and transferred to EDB.
As we mentioned earlier, NSTB was reorganized to focus on promoting research and developing R&D
manpower. The policies for technology commercialization were left to EDB to implement.
4.4. Biomedical sciences as a pillar of growth
In Singapore, industrial planning and sector targeting had always been part of the government’s
economic policy. Faced with increasing competition in the manufacturing sector, particularly in the
electronics subsector, from countries such as China, the Singapore government announced in 1999 that it
will devote least $2.3 billion in investments, grants, and other incentives to develop Singapore into a hub
for research in biomedical sciences by 2010. A US$1 billion Life Sciences Fund was launched in 2000 to
accelerate the funding of R&D and technology commercialization in the life sciences.
This push into life sciences is part of the Industry 21 Program that was formulated by the EDB as a
blueprint for Singapore’s new economic strategy. Under this strategy, biomedical sciences will join
electronics, chemicals, and engineering as the fourth growth pillar. Specifically, Singapore aims to
become regional R&D leader in the fields of pharmaceutical research, medical devices, healthcare
services, and biotechnology. The ambitious targets include (a) at least 15 world-class companies
establishing regional headquarters in Singapore; (b) Singapore as a regional centre for clinical trials and
drug development. So far, major pharmaceutical companies, such as Eli Lilly, have set up operations in
Singapore. Eli Lily has set up its first System Biology R&D centre in Singapore in June 2001. This move
is a first for Eli Lilly in setting up a company outside the United States to focus on System Biology. This
upstream R&D facility, called the Singapore Systems Biology Centre (SBC), is the first biomedical
sciences company to utilize the Singapore Government’s US$600 million R&D fund set up to support
corporate R&D centres.
In 2000, the Bioethics Advisory Committee (BAC) and the Biomedical Research Council (BMRC)
were set up, respectively, to formulate the ethical and legal framework for Singapore’s biomedical
research and to formulate policies to develop research capabilities in biosciences. A BioMedical
Sciences Investments Management Team (BMSIMT) was also formed to make direct equity investments
in promising startups. By 2002, the BMSIMT has approximately invested S$150 million in 50 portfolio
companies. In early 2002, the government committed another S$1 billion to the fund.
To support the development of a pharmaceutical hub, a new research and manufacturing facility, the
Tuas Biomedical Park, is being developed on 160 hectares of reclaimed land. Another new research
facility, The Biopolis, will provide state-of-the-art infrastructure for laboratory-based R&D activities
tailored to companies in biomedical sciences. The Biopolis is part of a larger 200-hectare new science
park project, called One-North, that will integrate the existing Singapore Science Park (developed in
1980) into a larger research community modeled after Silicon Valley, with integrated residential,
schooling, and other facilities. Conceptualized in 2000, the One-North project is estimated to cost S$15
billion, or about US$8.6 billion, over 15 years. The One-North Science habitat is so-called, as Singapore
is located one degree north of the Equator.
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Financial incentives, in the form of tax relief and grants are being made available by the EDB to help
companies start up operations in Singapore. R&D andmanpower training grants will also be issued to help
companies start up operations in Singapore. Additionally, to build the pipeline of future research
professionals, a National Science Scholarships (NSS) was launched and managed by A-STAR in 2001.
The NSS scheme provides scholarships for Singaporeans to pursue studies and research training in the
biomedical sciences.
At the same time, the school curriculum at the tertiary and secondary levels has been revamped to
provide early grounding in life sciences. Efforts are also being made to upgrade the country’s
infrastructure in air, naval transport, and logistics. For instance, plans are underway to develop Singapore
as a chemical logistics hub with specialist capabilities to support the growth of the biomedical sector.
The push in the life sciences sector appears to have some early successes. In 2002, the biomedical
industry’s manufacturing output grew by 48%, from S$6.6 billion (in 2001) to S$9.7 billion, and its
value added grew by 76%, from S$4.0 billion (in 2001) to S$6.5 billion. Manufacturing employment
also extended by 11% and reached 7177 in 2002 from 6000 in 2001. The pharmaceutical sector’s output
of S$8.0 billion accounted for 82% of the total biomedical sciences manufacturing output in 2002
(against 76% in 2001) and enjoyed an increase in employment of 31%. Medical technology also reported
a 14% growth in manufacturing output to reach S$1.8 billion, while employment in this sector remained
stable in 2002, after growing by 11% to reach 7777 in 2001.
However, although the biosciences sector holds great promise for Singapore’s future economic growth,
it is also the sector that investors are somewhat wary of. Among the concerns is the fact that it takes at least a
decade to develop capabilities in the biomedical sector. There is also heightened competition from other
countries like China, India, andMalaysia, which are also building biotechnology industries of their own. In
particular, South Korean investors are reportedly also planning to spend $10.8 billion over the next 5 years
on biotechnology; of this, 40% of the funding will come from the government.
5. Conclusion: challenges ahead for Singapore
Singapore is in the midst of another economic transformation. As it moves closer to the technological
frontier, Singapore is taking steps to remake itself as an innovation-driven economy. In this regard,
science and technology policies will play an increasingly critical role in strengthening the nation’s
innovation and technological capabilities. The task ahead will not be easy. Singapore will face
formidable competition from countries with more resources as it competes closer to the technological
frontier.
While MNCs will continue to play a key role in Singapore’s economy, the government intends to
create domestic growth engines by nurturing local startups into world-class companies. The
Singapore government will also target and attract promising start-ups from elsewhere to Singapore
in order to provide new sources of innovation, industry regeneration, and future employment
creation.
It is important to note that while the government is devoting substantial resources to develop the life
sciences sector, it is not putting all its eggs in one basket. The EDB is coordinating the efforts to develop
Singapore into a hub for education services, fashion design, media, and communications. The goal is to
create different industry clusters and create agglomeration effects of attracting talent and new industries
from the region.
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Singapore has already made significant progress in deepening its technology creation capabilities,
especially in terms of increasing R&D and innovation intensity, the supply of venture capital, and
the building of a critical mass for an emerging life science industrial cluster. There have also been
significant policy changes to promote entrepreneurship and stimulate R&D. The key challenges to
sustaining the development of the innovation system in Singapore appear to be finding ways to
augment the small absolute size of the talent base, greater investment in basic research capabilities
of local universities, and improving policy support for technology commercialization activities. The
need to intensify investment in precompetitive basic research and infrastructures is especially
important for the life sciences cluster as well as for IT subsectors, such as wireless and broadband
applications.
Although Singapore is a small economy, its size constraint is not unique. Like Singapore, Finland is a
small population (about 5.2 million) economy, but it has been ranked number one on the Global
Technology Competitiveness Report [4], beating the United States and other countries with greater
resources. It is also the most competitive economy, according the 2003 WEF Global Competitiveness
Report [5]. A key factor in Finland’s successful management of its technology policy is the
development of a national innovation system that emphasizes entrepreneurship and technology creation.
There is a strong network of cooperation between new entrepreneurial ventures, research institutions,
universities, and established firms to disseminate and transfer both codified and tacit knowledge
(Lundvall [14]).
Another challenge to accelerate entrepreneurship in Singapore is to change the social and cultural
attitudes towards entrepreneurship, acceptance of nonconformity, and tolerance of failure. Educational
reform will play an important role in changing such societal values in the long term, but the emergence
of a greater number of successful technology entrepreneurs will help raise the critical mass in the
medium term by serving as role models and mentors.
In the short run, however, the most likely policy options that will have visible impact are continuing
deregulation of public sector bureaucracy, increasing teaching of entrepreneurial skills at the tertiary
education level and among working technical professionals, attracting foreign entrepreneurial talents to
start-up in Singapore, and providing incentives and support for universities and public research institutes
to commercialize their inventions through spin-offs. The government can also play a catalytic role in
helping local R&D institutions to establish closer networking and collaboration with partner institutions
in Europe, Japan, and North America. In general, there is a need to build stronger global network
linkages with key high-tech hotspots to expose Singaporeans to globally emerging opportunities, as
Singapore transitions into an innovation-based economy.
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Appendix
.
Table A.1
Economic growth and technological capabilities—latest statistics
GDP
growth
rate (%)a:
1995 to
2000
Per capita
GDP
growth
rate (%)a :
1995 to
2000
GERD
(% of GDP)b
RSEc Number of
scientific
articles
published
(1997)
Number of
scientific
papers in
1997 per
10,000
population
Number of
patents filed
by residents
and nonresidents:
1999
Number of
patents filed
in 1999
per 10,000
population
Argentina 2.63 1.34 0.48 2000 18 1999 2119 1.50 6457 4.39
Australia 4.00 2.76 1.61 1994 65 1998 11,793 12.54 63,355 65.57
Austria 2.47 2.31 1.64 1998 35 1993 3432 9.10 162,125 428.37
Belgium 2.76 2.52 1.55 1995 56 1997 4717 11.19 120,986 284.68
Brazil 2.28 0.93 0.91 1995 4 1995 3908 0.52 52,295 6.68
Canada 3.66 2.70 1.68 1998 57 1995 19,910 12.44 69,777 42.66
Chile 4.54 3.13 0.56 2000 9 2000 850 1.45 1716 (1995) 3.05 (1995)
China 8.24 7.23 1.10 2001 10 1995 9081 0.12 52,348 0.70
Denmark 2.66 2.24 1.94 1998 58 1998 3950 13.38 161,569 548.70
Finland 5.10 4.82 3.10 1999 94 1998 3897 14.95 159,034 609.96
France 2.48 2.11 2.21 1997 60 1998 26,509 10.15 138,458 52.26
Germany 1.74 1.62 2.33 1998 60 1998 36,233 8.84 220,762 53.97
Greece 3.32 3.12 0.48 1997 24 1997 2123 4.74 119,772 263.95
Hong Kong 3.40 1.38 0.30 1996 2 1995 2080 6.13 6040 17.06
Indonesia 0.68 0.94 0.07 1994 3 1985 123 0.01 42,503 4.28
Ireland 9.65 8.52 1.54 1997 52 1997 1118 7.44 120,796 767.45
Israel 3.81 1.41 3.69 1999 37 1997 5321 21.56 49,414 188.28
Italy 1.89 1.72 1.09 1995 30 1997 16,405 6.43 128,263 49.99
Japan 1.45 1.22 2.80 1997 95 2001 43,891 6.50 442,241 65.00
Korea, Rep. 4.77 3.74 2.70 1997 48 1999 4619 2.01 133,127 56.05
Malaysia 4.67 2.16 0.42 1998 4 1998 304 0.35 6451 (1997) 7.35 (1997)
Mauritius 5.74 4.58 0.17 1989 9 1992 2 0.04 15 (1998) 0.30 (1998)
The Netherlands 3.51 2.91 2.01 1997 59 1998 11,008 15.15 123,515 167.99
New Zealand 2.29 1.34 1.21 1997 44 1997 2308 12.37 47,640 250.54
Norway 3.06 2.45 1.68 1997 79 1999 2501 11.01 50,662 218.99
Philippines 3.55 1.48 0.21 1992 4 1992 159 0.05 3361 1.08
Portugal 3.60 3.43 0.63 1997 31 1999 1085 2.17 159,663 315.64
Singapore 6.35 3.60 1.90 1999 69 1999 1164 6.10 51,495 261.17
Spain 3.75 3.62 0.84 1998 36 1999 11,210 6.59 163,094 94.27
Sweden 2.88 2.79 3.76 1997 86 1999 8219 17.16 165,052 344.38
Switzerland 1.78 1.38 2.55 1992 55 1996 6935 18.25 162,402 423.16
Thailand 0.24 0.47 0.10 1997 2 1995 356 0.10 5071 (1998) 1.41 (1998)
United Kingdom 2.81 2.42 1.81 1997 55 1998 38,530 13.09 192,876 64.82
United States 4.19 2.92 2.51 1995 90 2001 166,830 12.05 294,700 20.66
Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
a The GDP growth rate is the compound annual average rate from 1995 to 2000.
b GERD stands for gross expenditure on R&D. It is calculated as a percentage of GDP and is averaged over all available
data points.
c The number pf research scientists per 10,000 labor force. In absolute numbers, China has the second highest number of
researchers in the world, with 743, 000 behind the 1.3 million in the United States but ahead of Japan and Russia, with 648,000
and 505,000, respectively (2003 OECD Report).
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Table A.2
Economic growth and technological capabilities, 1980 to 2000
GDP growth
rate (%)a
Per capita
GDP growth
rate (%)a
GERD
(% of GDP)b
RSEc Average number of
scientific articles
published annually
Average number
of patents filed
by residents
and nonresidents:
1995 to 1999
Argentina 1.49 0.09 0.44 13 1477 6212
Australia 3.39 2.02 1.51 59 10,214 51,688
Austria 2.29 1.93 1.52 35 2619 121,629
Belgium 2.08 1.87 1.58 51 3904 93,483
Brazil 2.12 0.42 0.91 4 2354 40,235
Canada 2.75 1.60 1.64 49 20,456 58,377
Chile 5.17 3.55 0.56 9 705 1716
China 9.66 8.29 0.06 6 4696 59,448
Denmark 1.94 1.74 1.82 49 3629 119,763
Finland 2.64 2.23 3.10 94 3034 109,522
France 2.12 1.67 2.35 57 22,333 117,718
Germany 1.70 1.69 1.70 58 31,082 183,935
Greece 1.48 1.02 0.46 20 1442 89,676
Hong Kong 5.46 3.89 0.60 2 772 6263
Indonesia 5.29 3.46 0.27 3 90 23,510
Ireland 5.36 4.78 1.37 40 850 105,525
Israel 4.40 1.95 2.84 37 4800 40,676
Italy 1.92 1.81 1.18 30 12,351 110,727
Japan 2.75 2.33 2.83 104 36,013 432,532
Korea, Rep. 7.36 6.22 2.30 43 1532 128,286
Malaysia 6.51 3.75 0.27 3 252 6451
Mauritius 5.68 4.60 0.30 6 5 15
The Netherlands 2.49 1.89 1.94 49 9190 109,742
New Zealand 2.24 1.19 1.10 34 2015 40,837
Norway 2.88 2.41 1.73 69 2297 42,309
Philippines 2.27 0.02 0.17 4 140 3456
Portugal 2.92 2.79 0.61 25 568 137,165
Singapore 7.51 4.80 0.84 34 602 44,699
Spain 2.73 2.45 0.84 29 6790 141,583
Sweden 1.95 1.62 3.37 71 7548 143,181
Switzerland 1.45 0.80 2.55 48 5758 140,944
Thailand 6.09 4.71 0.12 2 284 5257
United Kingdom 2.45 2.15 2.05 48 36,852 172,425
United States 3.23 2.13 2.56 71 170,808 264,727
Source: World Bank Development Indicators.
a The GDP growth rate is the compound annual average rate from 1980 to 2000.
b GERD stands for Gross Expenditure on R&D. It is calculated as a percentage of GDP, and averaged over all available data
points.
c The number pf research scientists per 10,000 labor force, average over 1980 to 2000, using available data.
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